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This is one of three papers derived from research on North-South 
resource trade performed in the  System and Decision Sciences Area during 
the summer of 1982. The aim of this research was, first, to  construct a model 
of NorthCouth trade, and then to use it as a framework for further work in 
gaming, negotiations and interactive decision making. 
In this paper, two models already developed by the author are  modified 
and combined to produce a simple model of NorthCouth trade. -This model is 
then reformulated in such a way that it can be used as the basis of an experi- 
mental game for the development of resource pricing policies. 
ANDRZE J WIERZBICKI 
Chairman 
System and Decision Sciences 
The purpose of this note is to construct and analyze a model of North- 
South trade in resources, which could then be used as the basis of an experi- 
mental game for the formulation of resource pricing policies. The South 
trades oil for industrial goods with the North. Each region has one policy 
parameter: the North, a tax on oil, and the South, the price of oil. Each 
region has two economic objectives: the North, higher output and higher real 
wages, and the South, higher revenues from exports and higher output levels. 
The policy instruments are used to define strategies: the payoffs of these 
strategies are given by the general equilibrium solutions of the model. 
TAXES AND RESOURCE PRICES: 
A NORTHSOUTH GAME 
Graciela Chichilnisky* 
1. IrnODUCIION 
The economic model of NorthSouth trade presented here is a modifica- 
tion, and synthesis, of two models already described by Chichilnisky (1983a,b). 
The model is given in the form most suitable for experiments on North-South 
trade policies, following an approach developed by Fortuna (1983) and 
Wierzbicki (1983). 
We consider a two-region model, in which one region (the South) exports 
oil to the other (the North) in exchange for industrial goods. Each region has 
two outputs, basic goods and industrial goods. Each good is produced using 
three inputs: capital, labor and oil. 
This model differs from that  presented in Chichilnisky (1983a) in that  
here we have a full macroeconomic description of both regions, rather than of 
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one region only. This model also differs from the two-region model given in 
Chichilnisky (1983b) in tha t  (i) the policy variable for the South is here the  
price of oil, ra ther  than the level of oil exports, and (ii) we also consider a pol- 
icy variable for the North, namely a tax on oil. 
Finally, we present the  two-region mociel in a so-called "reduced form", 
i.e., a s  one equation that  can be used to solve the whole model; this is the  
most suitable form for experimental work on N o r t h S o u t h  trade policies. 
2. THE MODEL FOR THE NORl'H: TAX POLICIES 
The economy of the North is described by six behavioral equations, and 
seven equilibrium conditions. Considering first the behavioral equations, we 
have 
~ ~ = m i n ( ~ ~ / a ~ , d ~ / b ~ . ~ ~ / c ~ )  , (1  
where B is the  basic good. The superscript S indicates supply, LB is  labor 
employed in producing B, zpB and K~ y e  respectively the oil and capital 
employed in producing B, and al,b ] ,c are  positive real numbers. This is a 
typical production function with fixed factor proportions. 
Similarly, for t h e  industrial good I, the  production function is 
while for oil I9 we have 
*s=o , 
i.e., t h e  North produces no oil (we could equally well put dS = C, where C is an 
arbitrary constant). Labor supply is positively linked to  real wages: 
where L' represents labor supply, w wages, and% t h e  price of B. Similarly, 
where KS represents capital supply and T the rate of return on capital. We 
postulate the following demand behavior at equilibrium: 
where the superscript D denotes demand, i.e., wage income is spent on B, so 
that B is a "wage good.  
The equilibrium conditions are: 
KS = K D  , 
BD = BS , 
i.e., B is not  traded internationally; 
q'= I S - I D  1 
where ~ F d e n o t e s  exports of I; 
xg = g D  = z p D  -3' , 
where X$ denotes oil imports; 
b , ~ ~ + b ~ I ' = d ~  , 
PIX?= psx: . (13) 
which is  a balance of payments condition, where pI a n d p d  denote the price of 
industrial goods and of oil, respectively. 
The national income identity (or Walras' law) is always satisfied at equili- 
brium: 
which (at equilibrium) is equal to 
The model of the northern economy therefore consists of 13 equations in 
s D 15 variables: I , I , x?, l p S ,  l p D ,  xi, BS. BD,  r ,  PB. pl. pd ,  W ,  L ,  and K. It fol- 
lows that  for a given price of oil, p,,, the model is "closed" in relative prices. 
Since the price of oil is given, there is thus no room for policy in the model as 
formulated above. 
We now introduce a new parameter, a tax on oil, into the model of the 
North. The taz  ate is denoted by the variable t .  The above 13 equations must 
now be modified to take this into account. 
First note tha t  the production functions (1) and (2) are equivalent to the 
following price equations (assuming competitive behavior), before trrz: 
From now on we shall use price equations (14) and (15) instead of production 
functions (1) and (2). After taz, these price equations become: 
The total tax revenue is thus t g D .  If a fraction A, 0 < A < 1, of this revenue is 
allocated to wage income, and the complement (1 - A )  to capital income, 
equation (6) becomes: 
and Yialrase law now becomes (a t  equilibrium): 
so tha t  a t  equilibrium we have 
The tax on oil having been introduced, the northern economy is now 
described by a system of 13 equations in 16 variables, where the original equa- 
tions (14), (15) and (6) are replaced by their equivalents under tax, (14'), (15') 
and (8 ' ) .  Since the tax rate represents a new variable, the equilibrium posi- 
tions of this model now depend o n  two parameters ra ther  than one working in 
relative prices. We take these parameters to be the price of oil pd, which is 
the policy variable of the South. and the tax rate t ,  which is the policy vari- 
able of the North. In the next section we present a model of the southern 
economy, and show that  given the tax rate t and the price of oil pd, there 
exists a (locally) unique equilibrium for the Nor thSouth  trade model. This 
means that  when the North chooses its policy parameter t and the  South its 
policy parameter p4, the  equilibria of both regions, and of the world economy, 
are determined. In particular, the  output of goods in both regions, the  
Nor thSouth  terms of trade p4/pl, the volume of industrial goods exported by 
the North, and the real wages and rates of profits in both regions are all deter- 
mined by the  choice of t and p4. Therefore, our Nor thSouth  model can actu- 
ally be interpreted as a game l o r n  G, i.e., a map from strategies to outcomes: 
N o r t h S o u t h  Outcomes 
strategies 
( t  ,pd> G +NorthCouth  
trade equilibrium 
The game form G is a map tha t  assigns an equilibrium to  each pair of 
strategies t and p+. If in addition we define the  objectives of the  two regions, 
i.e., the set  of variables tha t  each region wishes to maximize, we would then 
have obtained a well-defined game from our model. 
The model of the  southern economy is  defined in the  next section, we 
then give the "reduced form" of the  Nor thSou th  model, and the  game G is 
described in more detail in the final section. 
3. THE MODEL FUR THE SOUTH: OIL PRICING POLICIES 
The economy of the  South is described by five behavioral equations and 
seven equilibrium conditions. The behavioral equations are similar to those of 
the North (except tha t  the  parameters a], a2, b l ,  b2, c l ,  c2, a and /3 may be 
different): 
where the output of oil is n o t  constrained t o  zero; there  is only a total endow- 
ment  condition $S r s, which in some cases will not be binding. The output of 
oil i s  therefore "passive", adjusting to  demand. We assume tha t  extraction of 
oil is cost-free, i.e., i t  uses no factors of production. 
The equilibrium conditions are, as in the  North: 
KS= KD = C , B ~ +  c2ls 
x f ' = r D - ~ ~  , 
where Xf' denotes imports of industrial goods; 
% = a s - @  , 
where X$ denotes exports of oil; 
z p D = b 2 l S + b 1 ~ S  , 
which is the balance of payments condition. 
The national income identity is always satisfied a t  equilibrium: 
p B ~ D  + = w~~ + 7 S D I ~ S  + pdgS . 
Equivalently, (30) can be written 
where d D  denotes the amount of oil employed in the South. Equations (30) 
and (31) are  identical a t  equilibrium, because of the  balance of payments con- 
dition. The economy of the South is therefore represented by a system of 12 
D S equations ((18) to (29)) in 15 variables, f S ,  f D ,  xP, I9', I9 , A&, 
BS, BD. T .  p ~ ,  P I .  pd,  w ,  L and K. The equilibria of this model once again form 
a two-parameter family, assuming relative prices. One of these parameters is 
taken to  be the price of oil p d .  In the next section we show that, when the 
equilibrium conditions for international trade are taken into consideration, 
the equilibrium of the Nor thSouth  model is fully determined up to  two 
parameters, the price of oi lp* and the taz rate t in the North. 
4. THE NORTHSOUTH MODEL 
, Here we consider simultaneously the 13  equations for the North [(3)-(5), 
(69, (7)-(13), (14') and (15')], and the  corresponding 12 equations for the  
South [price equations (14) and (15), and (20)-(29)]. (Recall that  the South 
does not  have taxes and that flS # 0 in the  South.) We also require a set  of 
world equilibrium conditions, which are given below. 
The international market-clearing conditions for an equilibrium are (i) 
that  oil exports must equal oil imports: 
(where the S and N in parentheses indicate the  South and the  North, respec- 
tively); and (ii) that  exports of industrial goods must equal imports of indus- 
trial goods: 
The following two equations state tha t  the  prices of internationally traded 
goods must be equal a t  equilibrium: 
We may now determine the number of equations in the  North--South 
model. First note that  the balance of payments conditions of the two regions 
(13) and (29) are  equivalent, from (32) to  (35). We therefore have 12 equations 
for the  North and 12 for the South, plus the  four international trade condi- 
tions (32) to  (35), making 28 equations altogether. 
There a r e  16 variables in the North, including the  tax on oil, and  15 in t he  
South. We thus  have 31 variables and 28 independent equations. The North- 
South equilibria can therefore be determined in relative prices if we make two 
parameters  exogenous; we choose these to  be the  two policy variables, the  oil 
t ax  r a t e  t for t h e  North and the  price of oil pd for t he  South. 
The next section shows this explicitly, producing one equation which 
gives a "reduced form" solution to  the  model. 
5. SOLVING THE NORTH--SOUTH MODEL: A mDUCED FDRM 
In order to  solve the  model in relative prices, we choose B in t he  North as  
t h e  'numeraire ' ,  i.e., pB(N) = 1. From now on, all prices a r e  given relative to  
t he  price of B in t he  North. 
The production functions (1) and (2) yield equations for the  demand for 
factors K, L and IJ .  At each level of output,  when factors are  used efficiently, 
we have 
L~ = ~ ~ a ~  t ISaz (36) 
Equations (36) and (37) imply 
where D is  a lc  - a2c I. 
The (taxed) price equations for the  North (14') and  (15') can be regarded 
as a sys tem of two equations in two variables (taking p,, as a constant), yield- 
ing 
Then, substituting L and K from (4) and (5), and w and T from (41) and (42) 
into (39) we obtain an equation relating the supply of basic goods B to the 
price of industrial g o o d s p ~  and the price of oilpd, i.e., 
where M = a 1 b 2  - a 2 b 1  and N = c 1 b 2  - b1c2. 
Similarly, we obtain 
- L] + 
- c 2  - m d ( 1  + t ) ]  a (44) 
PI 
Consider now the demand relation 
Since BS = B ~ ,  we obtain, using (41), (42), (44) and (12) 
Equation ( 4 7 )  above is the reduced f o r m  of the Nor thSou th  model, link- 
ing the  price of oil pd and the tax rate t with the  price of industrial goods a t  
equilibrium, p;. I t  is now a simple matter  t o  check that  when p,, and t are 
known, a n d  therefore an equilibrium value of p i  can be obtained from ( 47 ) ,  the  
N o r t h S o u t h  model is "closed", i.e., the  equilibrium values of all other vari- 
ables can be computed. We s tar t  with the  North. 
Given pd and t .  we obtain the  equilibrium price p; from ( 47 ) .  F'rom (4'1) 
and ( 4 2 )  we obtain the equilibrium wage level w and profit ra te  r '. We can 
then obtain the  equilibrium capital supply K ~ *  and labor supply L ~ *  from ( 4 )  
and (5). Equations (39) and (40)  yield and lS*, and thus we obtain 
@* = A$*(N). Since p f i ~ i * ( ~ )  = p; r(~) ,  i t  follows tha t  XY can be found, so 
that  lD* = lS* - q S * ( N )  can also be found. The model for the  North is thus 
closed. 
We show next that the model for the  South is also closed. Consider the  
two price equations for the South: 
or equivalently, 
and 
These equations lead to  
Note that  pd is an exogenously given policy variable, and pi is given by (47)  as 
the equilibrium solution corresponding to p4. P; = P:(pd). Therefore (49) 
yields a relation connecting w / p B  and r .  There is an implicit assumption 
here that  the price of industrial goods is determined both by the price of oil 
(the policy parameter of the South) and by the market activity of the North. 
Next, consider the equilibrium condition BD = BS. From BD = w L / p B  
and gS = ( c2L  - a z K ) /  D ,  since L = a w / p B  and K = /3r, we obtain 
which is another relation between w / p B  and r .  Equating (49)  and (50) ,  we 
obtain the equilibrium values of real wages ( w / P B ) '  and the rate of profit r 
in the South. From ( w / p B ) *  and r ' we obtain L" and K", and hence B'* and 
rS*. using (39 )  and (40) .  Finally, since x~'(s)  = X?*(N) at  equilibrium, we 
obtain the equilibrium demand for I in the South, rD*(s), which equals 
I'*(s) + @'(s). This completes our calculation of the equilibrium for the 
South. 
6. THE NORTHSOUTH MODEL AS A GAME 
We have previously mentioned that the model can be used to construct a 
game f o m ,  which is the  generalization of a payoff matrix, 
G : ( t  ,p+) Equilibrium outcomes: 
pd* ,pI*, r (N)* , r(S)* , Afs*,... 
In order to fully define a game, we now only have to specify the objectives 
which the two players (the North and the South) pursue when choosing their 
strategies. 
We assume that  the  North wishes to optimize two variables, the total  value  
o j n e t  output  
and the real  w a g e  
The South wishes to optimize two variables, total n e t  output  
and the leve l  of indwtq-ial goods imported  in ezchange for  oil 
xpcs, . 
In a traditional game-theoretical approach, we would define preferences 
over the  outcomes, and subsequently adopt an equilibrium concept to deter- 
mine the solutions of this game. The approach pioneered by Fortuna (1983) 
a n d  Wierzbicki (1983) is different, since i t  is not necessary to have well- 
defined preferences over all possible outcomes in order to find a (Pareto) solu- 
tion. 
I t  would also be of interest  t o  resolve a number  of questions related to  
marke t  behavior, such as: 
- What is the  range of oil prices for which factor prices (profits r and wages 
w )  a re  positive in both regions? 
- How do real  wages w / p B  in t h e  South depend on the  price of oil pd? 
A numerical solution of the  model would provide approximate answers t o  these  
questions. 
7.  CHANGES IN TECHN0LM;IES 
We shall close with a discussion of the  possible impact of t a x  policies on 
the  technologies used in t h e  North: the model of the  North may be al tered to  
include t h e  impact  of the  oil tax on these technologies under  a number  of di f -  
ferent  assumptions, such a s  "learning by doing", or  more direct government 
intervention. 
For instance, consider the case where h = 0, so  t h a t  all the  proceeds from 
the  oil tax a re  t ransferred t o  capital income (increasing the  demand for indus- 
trial  goods) u n d e r  the  condi t ion t h a t  oil/output coefficients 1/ b  and  1/ b 2  be 
increased (i.e., investment  should be in  technologies which are' less oil- 
intensive). In this  case we may postulate* tha t  the inverses of t h e  oil/output 
coefficients b l ,  b 2  decrease as t h e  tax  revenue allocated t o  the  improvement 
of technology in each  sector  increases,  i.e., 
*This formulation was suggested by Wierzbicki. 
Equations (51) and (52) now7 become part of the model of the  North. Since 
there a re  two more variables (Kl and Gz) and two more equations, the solu- 
tions have the  same characteristics as before. 
However, i t  should be pointed out that  some of the  computations made in 
the  previous sections no longer apply, and in particular that  the reduced-form 
equation must be modified to include b", and K2 as variables depending on t 
and gD. 
This completes the forhulation of the  Nor thSou th  trade game. The next 
step is to  implement this game experimentally, in an attempt t o  discover 
resource pricing policies tha t  a re  consistent with the goals, and the strategic 
behavior, of both North and South. 
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